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Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice
Act: A Proposal for Automatic Attorney's
Fee Awards
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act' as an inno-
vative experiment 2 in using attorney's fees awards toward a new and
pressing end-that of ensuring administrative accountability.3 Congress
feared that parties with limited resources were too often being coerced into
compliance with government orders, discouraged by the high costs of liti-
gation" and the far greater resources behind government litigators5 from
bringing even the most meritorious suits against administrative agencies.'
Allowing such governmental actions to go unchallenged, Congress feared,
1. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982) and 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as EAJA or the Act].
The Act contains provisions authorizing attorney's fee awards in both judicial proceedings, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1982), and in administrative actions, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). Awards in judicial proceedings
are governed by two main provisions: § 2412(b), which waives the government's sovereign immunity
to fee awards and makes it liable for fees to the same limited extent that any private party would be,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982); and § 2412(d)(1)(A), which authorizes fee awards against the govern-
ment in a broad range of additional cases, id. § 2412(d)(1)(A). This Note is exclusively concerned
with § 2412(d)(1)(A).
2. The Act was enacted with a three-year "sunset" attached to its central provision. See EAJA,
supra note 1, at § 204(d)(5)(e) (effective October 1, 1984, § 2412(d) is repealed).
3. In establishing a general presumption in favor of an award in a broad class of cases, §
2412(d)(1)(A) represents a dramatic departure from both the common law and previous congressional
practice. At common law, the "American rule" has dictated that fee awards be used against private
parties only for the limited purposes of punishing bad faith conduct and distributing the costs of a suit
among its beneficiaries, and doctrines of sovereign immunity have insulated the government from any
fee liability at all in the absence of specific statutory authorization. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59, 267-68 (1975). While Congress has authorized fee awards
in many additional cases, it has done so by adopting fee-shifting provisions tied to specific statutory
policies deemed particularly important. E.g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E) (1982); the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731.(e) (1982); the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see also Equal Access to
Justice Act of 1979: Hearings on S.265 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979) (statement of Raymond S.
Calamaro, Deputy Ass't Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep't of Justice) (noting
previous "categorical" approach to fee-shifting, under which Congress provided for fee awards only
where the suit "advances a strong congressional policy"). Thus, although the number of provisions
authorizing fee awards against the government has almost doubled since 1960, Derfner, The True
American Rule: Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 251, 252
(1979), the vast majority of these provisions have been limited to cases brought under a single statute,
or section of a statute, id. at 254 n.12.
4. See EAJA, supra note 1, at § 202(a) (statement of congressional findings); S. REP. No. 1005,
Pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
5. See EAJA, supra note 1, at § 202(b) (statement of congressional findings); H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4984.
6. Congress was particularly concerned with the existing deterrents because of its perception that
the incidence of agency abuses was significant. See, e.g., Equal Access to Courts: Hearings on S.
2354 before the Subcomm. on Improvements.in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
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would only increase the danger that agencies would act arbitrarily, al-
ready a serious threat in an age of rapidly expanding administrative regu-
lation.' Thus, the prospect of fee awards for victorious private parties in
suits against the government was intended to act as both an incentive to
such challenges8 and a disincentive to unreasonable governmental actions
in the first instance.'
In keeping with these ambitious purposes, the Act was given broad ap-
plication, extending to virtually any civil case in which the government
loses.'0 The rule chosen to govern fee-shifting, however, was far narrower,
and adopted a compromise "substantially justified" standard under which
the government can avoid fee liability if it can prove that its "position"
was "substantially justified" or that "special circumstances" would make
an award unjust." Convinced, after three years of operation under this
standard, that the need for such legislation had been proven by experi-
ence, Congress passed a bill to make the Act permanent law in October,
1984.12 Despite legislative and popular support for the bill, however, the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (describing as one of the "great-
est threats" facing our system today the "excessive, arbitrary, nitpicking regulation and harrassment
of small businesses and individuals by government bureaucrats").
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 9-10. Congress perceived a "public interest" in
encouraging parties to vindicate their rights against unreasonable governmental actions. Id. at 10.
8. See EAJA, supra note 1, § 202(c)(1) (statement of congressional purpose).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 12. Congress anticipated that by giving those subject
to regulations the incentive to challenge them, the Act would "allow the agencies of regulation to be
regulated by those affected." 125 CONG. REC. 1437 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Domenici). It hoped that
the prospect of fee awards would force government litigators to carefully evaluate each case before
proceeding. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14; S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 4, at 7
(without the prospect of fee awards, the government does not have "the economic incentive or disin-
centive to closely evaluate the reasonableness of its case before proceeding"). It also hoped that re-
peated awards in an area would induce the agencies to institute improvements in their internal ma-
chinery. See, e.g., id. at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14.
10. The provision explicitly excludes only tort suits and cases in which fees are already authorized
under other statutes, and Congress specifically intended that constitutional torts be included. See H.R.
REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 18. The Act's coverage has been limited only slightly by the subse-
quent exclusion of cases before the Tax Court, which are now covered by a separate provision enacted
by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, see 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1982), and by
judicial rulings that cases before boards of contract appeals are likewise not included. Fidelity Con-
struction Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379, 1385-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 97
(1983).
11. The relevant section provides in full:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party
other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursu-
ant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in
tort) brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action,
unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
12. H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S14378-88 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984),
passed by Congress on October 11, 1984, would have made the Act permanent with a few minor
modifications, including an increase in eligibility limits, a provision for interest on awards, and clarifi-
cation of the deadline for filing fee applications. The most significant change would have been a
provision further defining the "position" of the United States. See Congress Renews Attorney's Fee
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President pocket-vetoed this initiative in November. 3 Reconsideration of
the bill is certain to be part of the legislative agenda in 1985.14
This Note argues that experience under the Act demonstrates that
while the concerns which prompted its passage remain vital, the "substan-
tially justified" standard chosen to implement the Act's broad purposes
does not go far enough. It proposes that Congress enact a permanent ver-
sion of the law, replacing the "substantially justified" standard with an
automatic fee-shifting provision under which the fee inquiry would be
limited to whether the private party prevailed, and on what claims. Such a
standard would far better serve the Act's purpose of encouraging private
parties to challenge unreasonable governmental actions, while also ade-
quately protecting the government enforcement interests that Congress in-
itially sought to accommodate in adopting a nonautomatic standard.
I. THE "SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED" STANDARD:
PRACTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
In practice, cases decided under the Act reveal that congressional fears
of agency abuses were well-founded, 15 and that the huge disparity in re-
sources between the government and certain private parties may indeed
create deterrents to suits. 6 At the same time, however, controversies over
Law, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2624 (1984).
13. See Equal Access Reauthorization Pocket Vetoed by President, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2964 (1984) (reprinting letter of disapproval).
14. Not only do the sponsors of the 1984 legislation intend to bring it before Congress again in
1985, but the President has avowed his intention to make passage of a modified bill a high legislative
priority in the coming session. See id.
15. Examples of abusive administrative practices range from decisions impacting on the lives of
single citizens, e.g., United States v. Pomp, 538 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (IRS not substantiallyjustified in suit, dismissed with prejudice, to collect penalty from defendant where record showed that
it had determined prior to filing complaint that defendant was not liable), to those affecting thousands,
e.g., Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (government not substantially justified
where plaintiffs obtained a $60 million settlement from HUD on behalf of class of low-income tenants
for HUD's refusal to implement subsidy program for low-income federal housing project tenants).
16. An examination of the government's opposition to fee awards in litigation under the Act pro-
vides a striking example of its ability to discourage private parties from challenging governmental
actions by litigating an issue vigorously, thereby significantly raising the costs to private parties of
pursuing even legitimate claims. The government has repeatedly raised every conceivable argument
against an award, even where it has been unable to convince a single court of the merits of its argu-
ment and even where its arguments are contrary to the clear legislative intent. See, e.g., Grand
Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("The
government . . . is attempting to protect its purse strings by consistently arguing, so far unsuccess-
fully, that the Act cannot possibly mean what it says."). Moreover, the government has not only
contested every fee issue, but has also appealed most of the adverse trial codrt decisions. See Report by
the Director of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts on Requests for Fees and Expenses Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, July 1, 1982 through June 30, 1983, at 3 (Sept. 23, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as AO Report]. Governmental opposition is clearly the primary cause of the exten-
sive litigation over many of the Act's terms, and may also be a major reason for the remarkably low
number of fee applications. See infra note 18. The "intransigence" of government lawyers, who
"waste public money by unnecessary and unjustified briefing and argument over points they must
know will be unsuccessful," has been cited as a major reason for the excessive time spent litigating fee
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the Act's application have seriously impeded the development of an effec-
tive fee incentive. Confusion has surrounded virtually every term used in
the statute, 7 and the number of fee applications has been strikingly low,
given the tremendous volume of cases covered by the Act.' Most signifi-
cantly, courts have found it extremely difficult to provide any meaningful
content for the "substantially justified" standard that governs fee-shifting
under the Act.
A. Congressional Failure to Define "Substantially Justified"
At the outset, courts applying the Act have had difficulty determining
when to award fees because of a central flaw in the Act's legislative his-
tory: Congress adopted the "substantially justified" standard without ever
adequately defining it. The term is not a carefully crafted term of art, but
rather a conscious legislative compromise, designed as an "acceptable mid-
dle ground" between automatic fee-shifting and the bad faith standard
issues under the EAJA. Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (Burns, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. There has been confusion in the case law over such issues as whether fees are to be awarded
in pending cases for work done before the Act's effective date, see Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp.
256, 260-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (relying on analogous statutes to apply the Act retroactively); when
parties have "prevailed," compare McGill v. Secretary of HHS, 712 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (party
who succeeds in having case remanded for taking of additional evidence has not yet prevailed on
disability claim), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984) with Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118,
121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (order of remand for new hearing sufficiently central to case to justify an
award); what parties can "incur" fees, see Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (parties represented without charge may "incur" fees within meaning of Act); and what
cases are excluded by virtue of an existing fee-shifting provision, see Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F.
Supp. 1320 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (fees not precluded in social security cases by virtue of § 406(b)(1) of
Social Security Act, which governs contingency fee arrangements).
18. At the time the Act was passed, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the
United States would lose 11,800 cases a year. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 22. However,
there was a total of only 177 petitions decided under § 2412 in the first 21 months of the Act's
operation. AO Report, supra note 16, at 2-4. Of these petitions, only 63 ultimately resulted in
awards. Id. This represents a mere fraction of congressional estimates of the number of awards that
would be made. The CBO estimate, for example, was that awards would be made in approximately
3,500 cases in 1982 and 3,700 cases in 1983. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 22. Similarly, the
Justice Department estimated that the government would lose 15-25% of the cases it litigates each
year, and that awards would be made in 25% of these, S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1979); using the 1978 figure of 54,000 cases litigated by the government, Hearings, supra note 3, at
51, this would yield awards in at least 2,025 cases a year. Thus the estimates exceed the actual
number of awards by over a hundredfold. The low number of awards under the Act has disproved
predictions of the exorbitantly high costs of such a program. These had ranged from an Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) estimate of $205 million during the first year, H.R. REP. No.
1418, supra note 5, at 23, to an estimate by the Senate Judiciary Committee of $20 million for its
third year of operation (assuming that costs would decrease as a result of the Act's expected deterrent
effect), id. at 20. In fact, awards totaling under $2.5 million were made in the first 21 months (with
one award accounting for $1.2 million). AO Report, supra note 16, at 2-4. Thus, the estimates of the
Act's cost upon reenactment in 1984 were as low as $3 million in fiscal year 1985, increasing to $5
million in fiscal year 1989. S. REP. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1984); see also id. at 6 (citing
figures and concluding that actual cost of the legislation was "approximately 1 percent of the esti-
mated cost").
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advocated by the Executive." The Senate selected the "substantially justi-
fied" standard only after the Justice Department expressed concerns
about the breadth20 and potential cost2 ' of the automatic standard origi-
nally considered. In deference to the Department's objections to a possible
chilling effect on legitimate government enforcement efforts,22 it adopted a
19. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14. The bill originally considered by the Senate had
provided simply that a judgment for reasonable costs and attorney's fees "shall be awarded to any
party other than the United States which prevails in any civil action . . . other than an action in tort,
brought by or against the United States. . . ." S. 2354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). In contrast, the
Justice Department's version would have allowed discretionary fee awards only where the prevailing
party could prove that the government had acted in an "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or ground-
less" manner. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note.5, at 14. This language was drawn from the standard
governing the few circumstances in which attorney's fee awards may be made to prevailing defendants
in civil rights suits under Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). That this
latter test is little more than a bad faith standard is demonstrated not only by judicial interpretations
under Christiansburg Garment, but also by declarations by the Justice Department that a bad faith
standard was what it intended under the Act. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 31. As such, it would
have rendered § 2412(d)(1)(A) unnecessary, since another portion of the Act provided that the United
States was to be held liable for attorney's fees "to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982), and would have sufficed to make the United
States liable for fees where it acts in bad faith.
20. The Department of Justice objected that the bill was not "carefully tailored" to be "limited to
those situations where the United States has regulated unreasonably or even where it has acted in
error. . . ... Hearings, supra note 6, at 36. It felt that in the great majority of litigated cases involv-
ing the United States "there is either a genuine dispute as to the facts, or the law is unclear as to the
respective rights of the opposing parties, or both," and that "[i]t cannot be said that their positions are
unreasonable." Id. at 30. Under these circumstances, it would be "unfair to saddle the losing party
with his opponent's attorneys' fees as a matter of course." Id. at 30-31. This argument erroneously
implies that the fees would be awarded against private parties who lost as well as against the
government.
21. The potential cost of the legislation was one of the Department of Justice's major objections to
both an automatic fee-shifting provision and the "substantially justified" standard which was eventu-
ally adopted. Interestingly enough, its estimate of the cost of an automatic provision, which it calcu-
lated would range from $130 to $250 million a year for awards at the trial court level, Hearings,
supra note 6, at 36, did not differ significantly from its estimate of the costs of a "substantially
justified" standard, which it calculated would range from $130 to $250 million a year for all court
cases, Hearings, supra note 3, at 12. In practice, total awards have been a mere fraction of these
estimated cost figures. See supra note 18.
22. The Justice Department argued that an automatic fee provision "might well discourage par-
ties with legitimate legal claims or defenses from resorting to the Courts," and that "potential litigants
might be loathe to espouse novel legal theories for fear of incurring additional expenses if they d~d not
prevail." Hearings, supra note 6, at 31. In its view, this would create a "chilling effect" with "serious
consequences for developing areas of the law." Id. These hrguments are extremely vague, and again
suggest that fees will be awarded against either the government or the private party. This is not,
however, the case, and it is unlikely that fee awards would deter the government from advancing novel
legal theories in the same way that they would deter private parties. See infra text accompanying
notes 83-85. The Justice Department also invoked its "constitutional obligation" to enforce the law.
Hearings, supra note 6, at 31. This argument reflects the Executive's view that as a coordinate
branch of government, its actions should be presumed to have been takefi in good faith unless it is
clearly proved otherwise; automatic fee awards, in its view, would create the opposite presumption of
bad faith on the government's part. However, the Act is premised on the theory that in a bureaucracy,
abusive governmental practices may result not solely through bad faith, but also through inadvertent
errors or problems of unclear jurisdiction. Therefore, to the extent that the Department's objection to
a chilling effect on enforcement efforts reflects the view that it is inappropriate to award fees automat-
ically because most government actions are legitimate, rather than being based on any genuine fear of
deterrence, it is directly contrary to the basic premises of the Act.
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compromise standard specifying that the court "shall award" attorney's
fees to prevailing23 private parties2" in cases involving the United States,
unless the government can prove that its "position" was "substantially
justified" or that "special circumstances" would make an award unjust;25
this was intended as a narrower fee-shifting standard than an automatic
provision. Nevertheless, in keeping with the idea of creating an incentive,
it was meant to be a mandatory rather than discretionary standard, sub-
ject to two narrow exceptions from fee liability based on the legitimacy of
the government's case.
Congress, however, failed adequately to define the exceptions to fee-
shifting which it thereby created. The legislative history reveals that Con-
gress intended to place the burden on the government to make a "positive
showing" of substantial justification,2" and to define "substantially justi-
fied" to require a "reasonable basis both in law and fact" for the govern-
ment's position.27 Beyond identifying certain case dispositions which may
indicate a lack of substantial justification, however, Congress did not de-
fine "reasonable," nor specify how such a showing was to be made.28 Sim-
ilarly, while Congress intended the "special circumstances" clause to en-
compass the "novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law
23. While awards are limited to "prevailing" parties, Congress specified that a party may prevail
without a full trial on the merits, as for example by a favorable settlement, a voluntary dismissal of a
complaint, or a partial victory. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 11.
24. Because of the congressional intention to help parties with limited resources, there are certain
income limits that must be met. However, eligible parties are defined broadly to include individuals
with a net worth not exceeding $1 million, and owners of businesses or organizations with a net worth
not exceeding $5 million or with 500 or fewer employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982). Under
the 1984 reenactment bill, these limits would have been increased to a $2 million figure for individu-
als and a $7 million figure for businesses. See H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
S14387 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
25. See supra note 11 (reprinting provision in full). This standard was drawn from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which make a party who wrongly resists discovery liable for attorney's fees
unless the court finds that its "opposition to the motion [to compel] was substantially justified" or that
special circumstances would make an award unjust. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 13. Congress placed the burden of proof on the govern-
ment for two reasons: First, it feared the "natural reluctance of courts to award fees" after so many
years of operating under the American rule, id. at 18; and second, it perceived that it would be far
easier for the government, "which has control of the evidence," to prove the reasonableness of its
action than for a private party to marshal the facts to prove that the governmental action was unrea-
sonable. Id. at 10-11.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Congress indicated that the court should "look closely" where there has been a judgment on
the pleadings or a directed verdict, or where a prior suit on the same claim had been dismissed, since
such cases "clearly raise the possibility that the Government was unreasonable in pursuing the litiga-
tion." Id. at 11. However, it stressed that there should be no presumption that the government's
position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case, nor should the government be
required to establish that its decision to litigate was "based on a substantial probability of prevailing."
Id. These latter qualifications clearly reflect the influence of the Justice Department's testimony. See
supra notes 20-22. In practice, however, the cases call both into question, since there are many cases
in which a government loss will logically support a presumption of unreasonableness, see infra text
accompanying notes 93-95, while part of the congressional intent in passing the Act was to ensure
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that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts," it provided no further
guidance.29 Thus, the legislative compromise left the exact contours of the
standard undefined, relying on the courts to supply any meaningful con-
tent. Even after three years of experience under the Act, Congress was
unable, upon reconsidering it in 1984, to provide much further guidance
other than to specify additional cases that lack substantial justification.30
B. Misplaced Judicial Emphasis on a "Nonautomatic" Standard
Faced with the congressional failure to define "substantially justified"
beyond describing it as a test of reasonableness-an explanation that adds
little, if anything, to the language of the provision itself-courts applying
the Act have often focused instead on the congressional description of the
standard as a compromise. Emphasizing Congress' intention to create an
intermediate standard between automatic fee-shifting and a bad faith test,
these courts have carefully avoided applying the standard in any manner
that would automatically lead to a fee award whenever the government
loses. The problem with focusing on the nonautomatic operation of the
standard, however, is that in certain important contexts even a test of sub-
stantial justification will result in virtually automatic fee-shifting. For ex-
ample, under the deferential standards that characterize judicial review of
most agency determinations,3 the agency will be reversed only if it acted
unreasonably. Thus, almost by definition, agency action that fails cannot
be viewed as "substantially justified." Similarly, in cases in which the pri-
vate party has prevailed by obtaining a favorable settlement, the govern-
ment has often conceded the case precisely because its initial action was
unreasonable. Under these circumstances, examining the governmental ac-
tion that led to the suit for its substantial justification will naturally result
in a fee award-despite the congressional intention to make the test a
nonautomatic one. Courts have resolved this contradiction between the
that the government indeed did not litigate against private parties without a strong case-and there-
fore a good likelihood of prevailing. See supra note 9.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 11.
30. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report specified that the government should not be found to
have been "substantially justified" where it is bound by departmental constraints to uphold a rule,
where it makes a "long-shot" argument to overturn precedent, where it ignores precedent, or where it
fails to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See S. REP. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1984) (citing cases decided under the EAJA). However, it noted that "it may be easier to
determine what is not 'substantially justified' rather than what is," id., and described the process of
defining the term as "undoubtedly a case-by-case matter due to the wide disparity of factual contexts
and legal issues that make up government disputes." Id. Thus, Congress recognized that the standard
selected is inherently ambiguous.
31. When private parties sue to challenge agency actions, courts usually review the administrative
decision under standards of review that give deference to the agency's expertise and judgment. While
the deference is greatest in the area of agency fact-finding, it is also characteristic of review of many
legal decisions made by agencies. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.09 (Supp.
1982).
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standard's nonautomatic operation in theory and its often automatic oper-
ation in practice in several ways-both of which emphasize the legislative
compromise at the cost of clarity and common sense.
1. The "Position" of the United States
Congress nowhere defined what "position" it intended courts to ex-
amine for substantial justification.12 However, courts interpreting the Act
have recognized that the problem of defining "position" represents a fun-
damental problem that Congress ignored in selecting the "substantially
justified" test: What will be found to be reasonable often depends on the
government behavior being examined. Thus, the most important area of
disagreement that has developed under the Act is an unanticipated split
among the circuits as to what Congress meant when it referred to the
"position" of the United States.
Courts interpreting the standard in light of the Act's broad underlying
purposes have unanimously concluded that "position" refers not simply to
the government's position in litigation but to whatever governmental ac-
tion forced the private party into court. 3 These courts have noted that if
examination is limited to the government's litigation posture, it would not
only insulate the agency from fee awards,3 4 but would also undermine the
idea of a fee incentive: Since a private party cannot anticipate what legal
arguments the government will make, such a restrictive interpretation of
"position" seriously impairs that party's ability to judge at the outset of
litigation whether a fee award is likely. 5
32. See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Congress "failed to clearly
resolve" the issue), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984). In government prosecutions this does not
present a problem, since there is only one "position" involved-the position the government takes in
the litigation. In cases reviewing agency decisions, however, or in cases originally brought against an
agency in federal court, there may be several government "positions"-the government conduct that is
at issue in the suit, or the arguments that the government makes in defense of that conduct. If a case is
settled, the government's "position" could refer to its action that initially prompted the party to liti-
gate, or to its behavior in settling.
33. See, e.g., Timms v. United States, 742 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[Tihe remedial pur-
pose of EAJA is best effectuated if we consider the totality of the circumstances present prior to and
during litigation." (citing Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1984))); NRDC v.
EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 707 (3rd Cir. 1983) (the Act's "plain meaning and the intention of Congress" is
to read "position" to refer to the "agency action that made it necessary for the party to file suit");
Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 352 n.7 (D.D.C. 1982) ("[I]t would contradict the
remedial purpose of the Act to interpret it to isolate and focus upon the reasonableness of only a single
element of the government's actions, when the entire factual background may suggest a contrary
conclusion.").
34. See NRDC v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3rd Cir. 1983) (analyzing only the government's
litigation position "means that no matter how outrageously improper the agency action has been, and
no matter how intransigently a wrong position has been maintained prior to the litigation, and no
matter how often the same agency repeats the offending conduct, the statute has no application, so
long as employees of the Justice Department act reasonably when they appear before the court").
35. See Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982) ("Obviously [the decision
to seek judicial relief] is made prior to the action, and therefore will not be swayed by the potential
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Nevertheless, other judges have held that such a broad reading of "posi-
tion" is inconsistent with the legislative compromise on a nonautomatic
standard. 8 Analyzing the possible scenarios in which a fee application
might arise, they have recognized that often the government's litigation
posture will be identical with the underlying action, such as where the
government initiates the case, or where it defends an agency action by
arguing that it was legally correct.3" However, it is where the litigation
position and the underlying action differ-such as in cases decided under
deferential standards of review or in settlement cases-that applying the
test to the underlying action would lead to virtually automatic fee-shifting,
contrary to the legislative intent.38 Thus, these judges recognize that by
reading "position" restrictively to refer solely to the government's litiga-
tion arguments, the standard can be applied nonautomatically.
The effect of such an interpretation, however, is to insulate from fee
awards those very cases in which the private party is likely to have the
strongest fee claims-cases in which the government declined to defend
the agency action on the merits. 9 Settlements provide a striking example:
where a private party obtains full relief by settling his case, it is usually
because the underlying governmental action was indefensible; for the same
reason, however, the government's decision to settle such a case is likely to
be faultless. Under these circumstances, which "position" is analyzed will
directly determine the outcome of fee litigation.40 Thus, a restrictive read-
ing of the "position" of the United States achieves nonautomatic results,
but only at the cost of undermining the more basic purposes of the
that the government might not comport itself with proper adversarial etiquette.").
36. See, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 1984); Spencer, 712 F.2d at
552; Operating Eng'rs v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 493-96 (D. Utah 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir. 1984).
37. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 551-52.
38. See Ashburn, 740 F.2d at 849 (to hold that "position" includes the underlying action "could
result in an automatic award to plaintiffs in many cases," such as those decided under the substantial
evidence or arbitrary and capricious tests); Operating Eng'rs v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D.
Utah 1982) (court suggests that relying on underlying action would "compensate all parties successful
in seeking judicial review of agency factual decisions").
39. See Stewart, Courts Debate Reach of Equal Access to Justice Act, Legal Times, May 16,
1983, at 16, col. I ("When the government itself is unwilling to defend its prior actions, almost by
definition those actions were not substantially justified. ... )
40. See, e.g., Del Mfg. Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 980, 984-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (once "liti-
gation position" theory is substituted for "underlying action" theory used by lower court, focus moves
from agency's "torpor and tardiness" before litigation was initiated to government's prompt concession
of case once complaint was filed, and fee award must be reversed); White v. United States, 740 F.2d
836, 850 (11th Cir. 1984) (if litigation position alone is examined, courts of appeals must reverse
district court's award, which erroneously relied on both the government's litigation position and the
underlying agency action); EDF v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1983) (government conceded that
underlying agency position was not substantially justified, but asserted substantial justification based
on its "promptly" entering into settlement negotiations).
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Act-providing fee awards to victims of unreasonable governmental
action.
2. Defining "Substantially Justified" Under Deferential Standards
of Review
Other courts resolve the problem of avoiding automatic fee-shifting by
allowing the "position" of the United States to include the underlying ac-
tion, but manipulating the definition of "substantially justified" so that fee
awards are not automatic. In cases decided under deferential standards of
review, the illogic of this approach becomes particularly clear; since appli-
cation of the standard to the underlying action tends naturally to result in
a fee award, courts must contort even seemingly clear language to achieve
nonautomatic results.
For example, under the "lack of substantial evidence" test,4" which is
frequently applied in cases involving the government,42 the court's inquiry
is limited to whether the agency's action is supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record as a whole. As long as adequate support exists, the
reviewing court will not reexamine the agency's decision. 43 In such cases,
it would make sense to hold that a lack of substantial evidence is
equivalent to a finding of no substantial justification.44 However, this
would make fee-shifting automatic in such cases.45 Thus, the courts have
attempted to define "substantially justified" in other terms, making dis-
tinctions based on the amount and strength of the evidence in the record.
They have held that while a simple finding of a lack of substantial evi-
dence does not require a conclusion that the government was not substan-
tially justified,46 a finding that there was no evidence in the record sup-
porting the agency decision does.47 Similarly, where there is some evidence
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982) (the reviewing court shall set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions "unsupported by substantial evidence").
42. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 195
(1979) (describing substantial evidence test as the "dominant standard for judicial reviev of factual
determinations by agencies").
43. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
44. See Operating Eng'rs v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah 1982) ("It is difficult for this
court to perceive how action unsupported by 'substantial' evidence could be 'substantially justified."').
45. See Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (since Congress did
not want automatic award of fees, it presumably intended question of substantial justification to be
decided separately from decision on merits under substantial evidence test).
46. See, e.g., id. at 1571 (lack of substantial evidence does not mean that government's position
"taken as a whole" lacked substantial basis); Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D.D.C.
1982) (lack of substantial evidence does not require concurrent finding of no substantial justification).
47. See, e.g., Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 55-56 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (while finding of
lack of substantial evidence does not automatically require fee award, where "record reveals no evi-
dence to support" findings, government is not substantially justified in defending); Hornal v.
Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) ("[W]hen there is little or no evidence support-
ing the government's position, the Court is obligated to award attorney fees.") (footnotes omitted).
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in the record supporting the government, but it is contradicted by over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, the government may be found to have
lacked substantial justification.4 Such distinctions are clearly untenable.
A similar problem arises in cases reviewed under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.49 In these cases, which include most rulemaking
proceedings,5" the standard for agency conduct is at least as stringent as
under the "substantial evidence" test. Here application of the substantial
justification test is even more clearly absurd, since it requires finding that
the government's action, which the court has just found arbitrary and ca-
pricious, was nonetheless reasonable."1
3. Legislative Recharacterization of the "Substantially Justified"
Standard
These cases suggest that by characterizing the "substantially justified"
standard as a nonautomatic one, Congress failed to appreciate how the
standard would operate in practice. This is, however, not a serious prob-
lem. In adopting the "substantially justified" standard, Congress was not
so much concerned with whether it would result in automatic awards as it
was with. whether the standard would chill legitimate government enforce-
ment efforts.52 Thus, the courts' emphasis on the nonautomatic nature of
the standard, rather than on the underlying interests that Congress in-
tended to protect, is misplaced. Moreover, if these interests are considered,
the resolution of a case against the government under a deferential stan-
dard or by a full settlement indicates that the agency action was most
48. See, e.g., Cole v. Secretary of HHS, 577 F. Supp. 657, 662 (D. Del. 1983) (finding govern-
ment's position not substantially justified where ALJ "egregiously misbalanc[ed] the evidence");
Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 618 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding government "totally unjus-
tified" in relying on incomplete medical report "in light of the overwhelming contradictory medical
evidence"); see also, e.g., Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1983) (government's
position will normally be justified if it relies on an "arguably defensible administrative record"); Ceg-
lia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (where Secretary's decision was "patently
unsupported by substantial evidence," government's position held not substantially justified).
49. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) ("the reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law").
50. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 552.
51. Most courts simply allow fee-shifting to become automatic in this context. See, e.g., Wade v.
Dole, No. 80 C 3072, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1983) ("[A] finding that the agency's action was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, is determinative of the private parties' right to fees.");
Grand Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
("It would be too much for the English language to bear to say that a position can be arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion but nevertheless 'reasonable."'). But see Gava v. United States,
699 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding government substantially justified despite lower
court's finding that its action was arbitrary and capricious).
52. While Congress described the standard as an "acceptable middle ground" between automatic
fee-shifting and a bad faith standard, H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14, this compromise was
motivated solely by its concern for the government's fear of a "chilling effect on proper government
enforcement efforts." Id.
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likely not a reasonable one-which is, in fact, why the automatic results
tend to occur in the first place. Thus, it would not be inconsistent with the
Act's purposes to resolve the problems created by the courts' misreading
by simply defining "position" expansively and clarifying the relationship
between certain review standards and a finding of substantial justification.
Upon the Act's reconsideration in 1984, Congress specifically recognized
this problem, and defined "position" to include both the litigation position
and the underlying agency action;5" this change was cited by the President
as his principal reason for vetoing the bill."
C. The Inevitable Problem of Inconsistent Definitions of "Substantially
Justified"
Even if the problems created by a misplaced judicial emphasis on the
"nonautomatic" characterization of the provision were resolved, however,
a far more fundamental problem with the selection of a "substantially
justified" standard to create a fee incentive remains. As long as the Act
covers both government prosecutions and defenses, and includes cases won
by both trial and settlement, courts will be called upon to judge both liti-
gation positions and underlying actions. At the same time, however, the
case law indicates that applying a single definition to both is impossible.
Thus, a "substantially justified" standard is inherently a discretionary
one, which can only be applied on a case-by-case basis.55 Even more im-
portantly, it is a grant of discretion for which it is impossible to develop
any consistent standards. This suggests that the choice of such ambiguous
language56 is simply incompatible with the idea of creating a fee incentive
in a broad range of cases. 57 This problem becomes clear by contrasting the
definitions of "substantially justified" developed in cases decided under
deferential review standards, discussed above, with those definitions
adopted to analyze legal arguments and settlements.
53. H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S14387 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Even
after this legislative amendment, the standard would still have been far closer to an automatic one
than to the compromise that Congress anticipated. This suggests that Congress failed to appreciate
that there is in fact a close relation in many cases between a private party's having prevailed and the
government's having acted unreasonably.
54. See Equal Access Reauthorization Pocket Vetoed By President, supra note 13, at 2964.
55. See Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring, Inc. v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir.
1982) ("Fixed rules cannot be established" for determining issue of substantial justification.). Con-
gress recognized this problem upon reconsideration in 1984, but failed to recognize its implications for
the standard's effectiveness. See supra note 30.
56. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 546 (several of Act's "crucial terms are distressingly ambiguous").
57. Without clear standards, announced in advance, fee awards can only be compensatory, provid-
ing after-the-fact payments for parties who successfully challenge governmental actions. While making
parties "whole" may be a desirable goal, however, it is a significantly different purpose than that of
creating a fee incentive.
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1. Evaluating Legal Arguments
While judges deciding on fee applications in cases decided under defer-
ential review standards must strain to define "substantially justified"
without creating automatic fee-shifting, in the context of judging the gov-
ernment's litigation position courts have the opposite tendency of reducing
the test to an "arguable" standard. In this area, the range of legal argu-
ments that might be considered reasonable is very broad.58 Thus, while
courts have required some support in the case law59 or regulations"0 for
the government's arguments, usually any contradictory precedent is
enough to make an argument reasonable,6" as are conflicting regulations, 2
or even a misreading of the legislative history.63 Similarly, while courts
have found the government's arguments unreasonable if they have been
repeatedly rejected by other courts, 4 or are contrary to the agency's own
58. E.g., Ramos v. Haig, 716 F.2d 471, 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1983) (government substantially justi-
fied where INS cites two cases which "arguably support its legal position," despite district court
finding of due process violation for detaining Cuban refugees for 15 months without a hearing); Kirk-
land v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1983) (Board's position was not "so
devoid of legal or factual support that a fee award is appropriate"); Gava v. United States, 699 F.2d
1367, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (government's litigation position was substantially justified where its
arguments were "cogent" and it "cited several cases" in support of its arguments, despite lower court's
finding on summary judgment that agency action was arbitrary and capricious).
59. See Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 541 F. Supp. 711, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1983).
60. See NAACP v. Donovan, 554 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D.D.C. 1982).
61. See Donovan v. Miller Properties, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 785, 790 (M.D. La. 1982), affd, 711
F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1983). While there is evidence that Congress intended that difficult cases of unset-
tled law be considered "reasonable," it is troubling that courts tend to find substantial justification
where there is any uncertainty in the case law. For example, many courts allow any "genuine dis-
pute," the term used in FED. R. Civ. P. 37, to defeat an award, see, e.g., Smith v. Schweiker, 563 F.
Supp. 891, 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (since Rule 37 is source of standard, if dispute is "genuine," losing
party is "substantially justified," even in social security case resolved under lack of substantial evi-
dence test), af/'d without opinion, 729 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Trustees for Alaska v.
Watt, 556 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D. Alaska 1983); however, this standard is lower than the "reasonable-
ness" test Congress intended, see Wade v. Dole, No. 80 C 3072, slip op. (N.D. II. Dec. 19, 1983).
62. See Foley Constr. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984); see also Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v.
Watt, 556 F. Supp. 155, 157 (D. Or. 1983) (government was substantially justified in its arguments
opposing injunctive suit where regulation was "convoluted" and difficult to interpret), modified sub
nom., Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984).
63. See Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 556 F. Supp. 99 (D.D.C. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part,
729 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(government's litigation position found substantially justified where it "complied with sound canons of
statutory construction, had some support in the legislative history, and contradicted no definitive con-
gressional purpose").
64. See Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (where all nine courts address-
ing the issue had ruled against the government, its arguments were not substantially justified).
1219
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1207, 1985
practice,65 it may be reasonable to attempt to "reopen a closed question," 6
or to invite the court to reconsider governing precedent.67
Courts have found it even more difficult to set limits on the range of
arguments they will find acceptable under the second part of the substan-
tial justification test, the "special circumstances" exception for "novel but
credible" attempts to extend the law.6" While one court has stressed that
such arguments must not only be novel but must also "merit the court's
careful examination,"69 the fact that a case is one of first impression will
often defeat an award.70 The breadth of this exception is particularly
problematic because of the courts' tendency simply to merge the "novel
but credible" concept into the "substantially justified" test, finding such
arguments reasonable.7 '
2. Evaluating Settlements
Cases involving settlements provide another particularly illuminating
example of the difficulty of giving any coherent meaning to "substantially
justified." If the government's decision to settle were the only issue that
the court examined, it would lead to a virtually automatic denial of fees in
every settlement case, since the government would always be found to
have acted reasonably; courts have found such a result to be clearly con-
trary to the Act's purposes.72 At the same time, however, in many settle-
ment cases the information generated about the underlying action is not
65. See Bertrand v. United States, 562 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Or. 1983).
66. Wyandotte Say. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982) (Board's position that
bargaining unit was appropriate was a "reasonable attempt to reopen a closed question," and was
substantially justified despite contrary precedent in same circuit).
67. S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 672 F.2d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (gov-
ernment's argument was substantially justified where it "presented an occasion for fresh consideration
of [existing] precedents" in same circuit).
68. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 11. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of
1976 contains an identical provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). However, § 1988 has been interpreted
more narrowly. See Watkins, A Statutory Primer: Attorneys Fees Against the U.S. Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 1983 ARK. L. NOTES 82 (describing case law under § 1988).
69. Nunes-Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812, 820 (D.D.C. 1982) (the clause "does not create a
different, less rigorous standard of review for all cases of first impression"; it "does not follow that
because the government's argument was untested, it was necessarily worthy of credit").
70. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 556 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D. Alaska 1983) (government's
litigation stance "can certainly not be characterized as frivolous" if pertinent statutory provision has
not yet been interpreted); Midwest Research Inst. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (case presented novel issue and therefore met guidelines for "special circumstances"), affd,
744 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1984).
71. See, e.g., Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 1104, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1983) (government's
argument was novel but credible attempt to extend law, therefore government was substantially justi-
fied); S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 672 F.2d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1982).
72. Finding all settlements to be fee-exempt would be contrary to the legislative intent to include
in its definition of "prevailing parties" those who prevail by favorable settlement. See, e.g., EDF v.
Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2d Cir. 1983) ("If ... by settling a case the government could automati-
cally make its position 'substantially justified' and thereby avoid any fee liability, the statute would
withdraw with one hand what it proferred with the other.").
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sufficient to enable the court to decide on any other basis.7 Thus, courts
have sought factors by which to distinguish different settlements.
Some courts have relied on the amount of time taken to reach a settle-
ment. However, this approach can raise the even more difficult problem of
distinguishing reasonable and unreasonable time periods." For this rea-
son, other courts have emphasized instead the timing of the settlement.
They have characterized as reasonable those settlements occurring imme-
diately after a complaint was filed, and unreasonable those occurring only
after the government filed some opposition in court.75 Both distinctions are
fairly arbitrary. Moreover, judgments about the reasonableness of settle-
ments are even more problematic where courts have found the government
to have been substantially justified in conceding an entire case, without
even entering into settlement negotiations.76
II. A BETTER STANDARD-AUTOMATIC FEE-SHIFTING
The problems which have developed under the "substantially justified"
standard thus reveal that it is inherently unsuited to creating an effective
73. See Citizens Coalitions for Block Grant Compliance v. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422, 426
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (where there has been "no trial on the merits and no admission of fault in a
consent decree or otherwise," such as in settlement cases, court has insufficient information about
underlying action and must examine reasonableness of government's litigation position); see also Wal-
ton v. Lehman, 570 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (adopting same rationale in summary judg-
ment case).
74. See EDF v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1086, 1089 (2d Cir. 1983) (majority found that seven-
month settlement negotiation period "is not a short period" given narrow scope of issues and brevity
of resulting stipulation, while dissent would have upheld lower court's determination that case was
settled "shortly" after it was filed). Examining the duration of the settlement negotiations also
presents the problem of determining which party caused the delay. See id. at 1086 (where all issues
settled in private party's favor, excessive length of negotiation period supports inference of government
delay).
75. See, e.g., Spencer, 712 F.2d at 555 n.58 ("[I]f the government does not immediately accede to
the plaintiff's demand, but instead initially opposes his claims and then at some later stage . . .
surrenders, the United States will be liable for attorneys fees. ... ); Watt, 722 F.2d at 1088 (New-
man, J., dissenting) ("I would impose liability every time the settlement followed the assertion of a
litigating position that was not substantially justified . . . ," but would not award fees "when the
Government offers no courtroom opposition at all.").
76. In such cases, the government may be found to have a reasonable litigation position, based on
the promptness of its concession, even where the private party obtained full relief, and the government
never defended its action at all. See, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir.
1984) (while district court found government not substantially justified where it "did not concede until
almost eleven months after the plaintiffs filed their complaint," appellate court reversed, finding that
the "Justice Department is entitled to the time reasonably necessary to receive and review the Ser-
vice's files"); White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 1984) (government found substan-
tially justified where it conceded issue three months after party raised it in complaint, reversing lower
court). Such cases combine the difficulty of defining "reasonable" periods of time with the unfair
results created by the court's refusal-or inability, given the lack of evidence-to examine the under-
lying action which forced the party to sue. Moreover, there are many ways in which a party may
prevail against the government without a full trial on the merits, including obtaining dismissal of a
complaint, entering into a consent judgment, or winning on summary judgment. See H.R. REP. No.
1418, supra note 5, at 11 ("The phrase 'prevailing party' should not be limited to a victor only after
entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits.").
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fee incentive. At the same time, the cases cast doubt upon the original
rationale for rejecting an automatic standard-fear of a chilling effect on
legitimate government enforcement efforts. Therefore, upon reconsidera-
tion in 1985, Congress should replace the "substantially justified" stan-
dard with an automatic fee-shifting provision, which would simply pro-
vide that unless otherwise specified by statute, the court "shall award the
reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys to a prevailing party other than
the United States in any non-tort civil action brought by or against the
United States.""
A. Automatic Fee-Shifting as the Optimal Fee Incentive
If using fees to create an incentive to private suits challenging unrea-
sonable governmental actions were the sole objective, an automatic stan-
dard would be preferable to the present standard in every respect. First,
an indispensible attribute of any fee incentive is that a party must be able
to judge at the outset of the litigation the likelihood of a fee award upon
prevailing. Under the "substantially justified" standard, however, it is vir-
tually impossible for parties to make this evaluation with any certainty.
Not only is the law governing fee awards extremely unclear, but awards
have no necessary relation to the strength of the party's claim. Thus, a
party cannot calculate, based on the facts of his own case, the likelihood of
a fee award if he prevails, 8 nor are the most egregious cases of govern-
ment abuse necessarily the most likely candidates for fee-shifting.
Under an automatic standard, awards would be certain for any quali-
fied prevailing party. Moreover, by tying the fee award determination to
the outcome of the case, an automatic standard would collapse the fee
evaluation into an evaluation of the likelihood of prevailing; the decision
whether to litigate, then, would be a single-, rather than two-tiered,
analysis.
Second, it is important that the fee litigation not become a full second
trial on the merits. 9 Lengthy fee disputes detract from the effectiveness of
77. This provision is based upon the original Senate version of the Act. See supra note 19.
78. At present, in order for a party to judge the likelihood of his obtaining a fee award at the
outset of a litigation, he must predict both what government behavior the court will examine and what
definition it will apply. Moreover, even if the party feels, based on this analysis, that the agency
action was so egregious that no court could find the government justified in defending the case, he still
cannot predict whether the government will settle and thus possibly escape fee liability.
79. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (1983).
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any fee mechanism by adding significantly to the cost and delay of litiga-
tion. Under the present standard, however, the threat of an extensive sec-
ond examination into the merits is quite real, since by its terms the stan-
dard specifically contemplates that the court reconsider the conduct at
issue in the suit.80
Under an automatic standard, only the questions of the prevailing party
and the amount of fees would be litigated. Not only would this standard
preclude an intrusive second judicial examination into the propriety of the
agency conduct, but it would limit the courts' consideration to issues on
which a significant body of case law has already developed under other
fee-shifting statutes."1 Eliminating the cost and delay of the fee litigation
would, moreover, be as important as creating a fee incentive for the un-
derlying litigation, since the disparity in resources between a private party
and the government may deter the vindication of meritorious fee claims as
well as of other rights.8 2
B. Automatic Fee-Shifting Would Adequately Protect Enforcement
Interests
While recognizing that fulfilling the Act's purposes called for an auto-
matic standard, Congress adopted the "substantially justified" standard in
response to Justice Department objections that certain legitimate enforce-
ment efforts would be chilled by automatic fee-shifting. However, the
cases shed doubt on the premise of the Justice Department's argument,
that enforcement efforts would indeed be chilled by the prospect of a fee
80. See The Awarding of Attorneys Fees in the Federal Courts: Hearings on S. 265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980) (statement of Alice Daniels, Ass't Attorney General, Dep't of
Justice) (standard "invites a retrial of the merits"); see also S. REP. No. 586, supra note 18, at 24
(letter from Robert A. McConnell, Ass't Attorney General, Dep't of Justice) (objecting to defining
"position" to include underlying action on ground that such a reading would generate a "potentially
far lengthier proceeding").
81. Congress explicitly indicated that courts should rely on existing case law in determining
whether a party has "prevailed." See H.R. RES'. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 11. Courts have also used
existing standards in determining the amount of fees to be awarded. See Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F.
Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983) (using 12 factor test to assess fee amount) (citing Kerr v. Screen
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 90 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976)).
82. The question of whether fees are available for the fee litigation itself has resulted in the
contorted consideration of whether the government's argument that it was "substantially justified,"
although ultimately found nonmeritorious in the fee litigation, is nevertheless itself "substantially jus-
tified," so as to require a denial of fees for that portion of the litigation. See Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729
F. 2d 801, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the "Kafkaesque judicial nightmare" created by applica-
tion of substantial justification test to fee litigation). Given that the same considerations apply to fee
litigation as to other litigation with the government, and that the Act's purposes would be seriously
jeopardized by disincentives to fee applications under the Act, there is a strong argument for making
fee awards for successful fee litigation automatic, even if an automatic standard is rejected for the
Act's central provision. See id. at 810 (adopting per se fee-shifting rule for fee litigation to avoid
"infinite regression" of EAJA litigation).
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award. Government decisions to sue to clarify developing areas of law or
resolve conflicts in regulations are often made as a matter of policy rather
than on the facts of a particular case,8" as are its decisions to bring test
cases.8 Thus it is not at all clear that the government's enforcement inter-
ests would be threatened in any significant way by the availability of fee
awards.85
Moreover, even if one accepts the possibility of such a chilling effect,
only a limited range of enforcement interests can be protected under the
standard without undermining the Act's basic purposes, and these can ac-
tually be well accommodated under an automatic standard.
1. Narrowing the Range of Protected Enforcement Interests
Exactly what the Justice Department meant when it referred to the
legitimate enforcement efforts that would be chilled by an automatic stan-
dard is unclear. However, taking the argument on its face, Congress
designed a standard that seems to contemplate two types of legitimate gov-
ernment enforcement efforts to be protected from fee-shifting. 8 First,
Congress anticipated that there would be cases involving unsettled or close
legal questions, particularly in developing areas of law, in which the gov-
ernment could not be sure of winning but nevertheless had a legitimate
interest in seeking a judicial resolution.8" Such close cases were to be in-
cluded in those found reasonable under the "substantially justified" test.
Second, Congress apparently also contemplated protection from fee-
83. In litigation under the Act, for example, the government has vigorously opposed every single
fee application, see supra note 16, a practice which strongly suggests that the Justice Department's
policy of opposition is not based on a careful evaluation of the merits of any particular fee application.
84. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 559 ("[T]here is no good reason to suppose that fee-shifting [in cases
in which the government challenges controlling precedent] will deter the government from bringing
such test cases.") (emphasis in original).
85. See id. ("If the issue is important enough, government officials, who of course are not person-
ally liable for the payment of fees, should not be dissuaded by the prospect of an award of fees to a
private party's counsel."); Hearings, supra note 6, at 12 (statement of Sen. Nelson) (where the
agency seeks to "expand its interpretation of the law in an uncharted area and the outcome is uncer-
tain, . . . it should not be deterred by the possibility that the individual or small business would
receive attorney's fees"); Lempert, Few Claimants Win Fee Awards in Agency Actions, Legal Times,
Apr. 25, 1983, at 5, col. 2 (where governmental parties are "policy-makers, not enforcement lawyers,"
often their "policy reasons for taking a certain position outweigh the legal considerations").
86. Since the legislative history does not explain what was meant by an automatic standard's
failure to "account for the reasonable and legitimate exercise of governmental functions," H.R. REP.
No. 1418, supra note 5, at 13-14, one must refer to the standard itself and to the brief Justice
Department testimony to determine what Congress meant to include in "proper government enforce-
ment efforts," id. at 14.
87. The Justice Department stressed that awarding fees in cases in which the law was unclear or
there was a genuine factual dispute would have a "chilling effect" with serious consequences for
developing areas of law. See supra note 22. The reasonableness standard was meant to eliminate such
cases from the Act's coverage. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14.
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shifting for test cases-government efforts to change unfavorable prece-
dents or reshape the law in new directions. Thus, under the "special cir-
cumstances" clause, "vigorous enforcement efforts" were also considered
among those legitimate enforcement efforts to be protected from fee
awards.RR
However, in adopting this compromise "substantially justified" stan-
dard, Congress failed to appreciate that exempting certain enforcement
efforts from fee-shifting is incompatible with the Act's basic purposes of
encouraging private suits and discouraging agency abuses. In particular,
as courts have recognized in reading the "special circumstances" clause
restrictively,"9 excluding government efforts to change case law seriously
undermines the purpose of a fee incentive. If the government escapes fee
liability in every test case, a private party will never know at the outset of
litigation whether or not to expect a fee award, since it cannot predict
what legal arguments the government will make. In fact, such an excep-
tion would exclude precisely those cases in which the party's expectation
of prevailing was most legitimate, based on existing case law.90 Thus, al-
though the differentiation is admittedly difficult, for the purpose of creat-
ing a fee incentive the concept of legitimate enforcement efforts must be
limited to close cases, and the fee-shifting standard cannot include an ex-
ception for test cases.
Moreover, although Congress adopted the "substantially justified" stan-
dard in order to except close cases from fee-shifting, the Act's basic pur-
poses require that certain types of close cases be included in fee-shifting.
In particular, Congress wanted to discourage the government from litigat-
ing cases, especially prosecutions, where there was or should have been
serious uncertainty on the government's part as to whether the law ap-
plied to the facts of the case at hand; such cases were prime examples of
the administrative abuses Congress sought to correct in passing the Act. 1
88. What Congress meant by "the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law
that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts," id. at 11, is not at all clear. However, the Justice
Department testimony stressed the government's constitutional responsibility to enforce the law, and
bringing test cases is clearly an important executive enforcement function. The government has thus
argued that the "special circumstances" clause encompasses test cases. See S & H Riggers & Erectors,
Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 672 F.2d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (government's attempt to "reopen a closed
question" is a "novel but credible extension or interpretation of the law").
89. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 559 n.72 ("the congressional committees pointedly did not refer to
good faith efforts to seek changes in existing interpretations of the law") (emphasis in original).
90. For the same reason, the party's fee claim may be strongest in these cases as well. See id. at
559 ("[T]he more clearly established are the governing norms, and the more clearly they dictate a
result in favor of the private litigant, the less 'justified' is it for the government to pursue or persist in
litigation.").
91. Congress specifically intended that fee awards would force government agencies to carefully
evaluate each case before proceeding, and "not to pursue those which are weak or tenuous." H.R.
REP. No. 1418, supra note 5, at 14; see also Hearings, supra note 6, at 12 (statement of Sen.
Nelson) ("[I]n those situations where the Government agency goes ahead without a strong case against
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This suggests that the range of close cases that can be included in legiti-
mate, fee-exempt enforcement efforts must be far narrower than Congress
initially appreciated in designing the "substantially justified" standard. 2
2. Equivalent Protection of Enforcement Interests Under An Auto-
matic Fee-Shifting Provision
This limited range of legitimate enforcement interests would be af-
forded virtually the same protection under an automatic standard as under
the "substantially justified" provision. The "substantial evidence" and
"arbitrary and capricious" review standards discussed earlier are only two
examples of the deferential standards that apply to review of agency ac-
tion.9" Agency decisions not to promulgate rules are given even more def-
erence,94 and many other agency actions are not reviewable at all, unless
they amount to a constitutional violation or are directly violative of an
express statutory provision. Thus, under most standards of review, a ju-
dicial reversal of an agency action carries a fair implication of government
conduct below a certain level of reasonableness." By limiting fee-shifting
a business; or where it is proceeding carelessly . . .I would be very happy if the enactment of this
legislation caused some chilling effect on Government regulatory efforts.").
92. The range of close cases that could be protected from fee-shifting without affecting the incen-
tive might include cases of serious conflicts in regulations, genuine disputes of material fact, or areas
of significant confusion in the case law. In these cases, the private party would be on notice, at the
outset of litigation, that a fee award was unlikely. Thus, such cases would not disrupt the fee mecha-
nism in the way that test cases would, nor would they be among those unreasonable enforcement
efforts which Congress specifically meant to deter. However, this Note argues that the costs of making
any exception to fee-shifting would far outweigh the benefits.
93. Such deferential review standards are applicable in a significant proportion of cases litigated
against the government. For example, in social security cases, which form one-fifth of the govern-
ment's civil caseload, Hearings, supra note 3, at 50, the applicable standard is the lack of substantial
evidence test. Similarly, in contract cases, which form over one-tenth of the civil cases involving the
United States, id., the standard governing judicial relief for unsuccessful bidders is one of "clear
illegality." See Foley v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984). Moreover, the standard governing the most significant cases-those
involving rulemaking-requires "arbitrary and capricious" behavior for an agency action to be over-
turned. See supra notes 49-50.
94. As long as an agency adequately explains the facts and policy concerns behind its decision not
to institute a rulemaking proceeding, and those facts and concerns have some basis in the record, a
reviewing court will not overturn its judgment. Foley, 716 F.2d at 1205 (citing WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
95. Such cases are immune from review under the APA because "statutes preclude judicial re-
view" or the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E)
(1982). See, e.g., Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980)
(judicial review under NEPA limited to ascertaining that agency considered environmental conse-
quences of its action).
96. See, e.g., Grand Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154, 1162
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding of arbitrary and capricious agency conduct has "already demonstrated that
the underlying position of the government was unreasonable").
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to prevailing parties, an automatic standard would still provide a signifi-
cant level of protection for these narrowly defined, reasonable government
enforcement efforts.97
Moreover, further protection for government enforcement interests
would be provided in the determination of the amount of fees to be
awarded. As with the "substantially justified" standard, fee awards would
be limited to the claims on which the party actually prevailed, rather than
the whole case.9" Courts have developed standards for calculating the
amount of the fee award under similar statutory provisions, notably under
the Civil Rights Acts, which allow fees to be assessed according to the
strength of the prevailing party's case.99 Thus, the fee award could be
reduced in. proportion to the "reasonableness" of the government's
action.1 0
Finally, to the extent that some legitimate governmental enforcement
interests receive less protection under an automatic standard, it is not a
concern that should be given overriding weight. The damage to executive
branch interests created by allowing some legitimate efforts to be assessed
for fees would be far less than the detrimental effects of allowing any
exception to a fee incentive. 0 While a narrower fee-shifting standard
than the "substantially justified" test could be designed without adopting
an automatic standard, allowing an exception would be extremely costly
in terms of both the clarity and certainty of the standard. In addition, an
exception could easily become a new outlet into which the present litiga-
tion over the issue of substantial justification could be channelled, and
thus might become an exception threatening to swallow up the rule. If the
97. It is true that deferential standards of review apply only in government defenses of agency
decisions, and not in government prosecutions. However, since Congress was particularly concerned
with deterring the government from bringing weak enforcement suits, the scope of what constitutes
"reasonable," fee-exempt, prosecutions must be quite narrow.
98. Courts have interpreted the Act to require awards only for those independent claims on which
the private party prevailed. See, e.g., Goldhaber v. Foley, 698 F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1983) (government
should be charged only with that portion of expenses attributable to its unjustified position); Mat-
thews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677, 683-84 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees
allocable to claim on which she prevailed).
99. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (1983) (holding that "the extent of a plain-
tiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award" under § 1988, and
that "the district court should award only that amount of fees which is reasonable in relation to the
results obtained").
100. Since the questions of which claims the private party prevailed upon and what is the appro-
priate amount of fees would still have to be litigated under this standard, it would be automatic only
in a very limited sense. Parties would still have to apply and prove their entitlement to fee awards.
This would ensure that fee awards, although undoubtedly higher than the present figures, would not
increase dramatically. In any case, the costs of the provision could rise significantly before they even
approached the figures that Congress was willing to authorize. See supra note 18.
101. See Hearings, supra note 80, at 17 (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("The few instances where
[the party] shouldn't be entitled to compensation balanced on the side of pushing the agendes and the
bureaucracy to be careful.").
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risk of deterring a few possibly meritorious government suits under an
automatic standard is weighed against that of creating a less effective in-
centive under an alternative test, the serious social costs involved in al-
lowing the government to litigate non-meritorious suits against parties
with limited resources must be found to outweigh any minimal damage to
government enforcement interests."0 2
CONCLUSION
The confused and inconsistent decisions which have resulted from the
courts' attempts to apply the "substantially justified" standard across the
broad range of cases covered by the Act indicate that it is not a standard
well-suited to creating an incentive for private suits challenging unreason-
able governmental actions. At the same time, they reveal that the fear of
government abuses and deterrence of meritorious suits continues to be well
founded. Therefore, Congress should enact a strengthened version of the
Act, replacing the "substantially justified" standard with an automatic
fee-shifting provision. Such a standard would serve the congressional pur-
pose of creating a fee incentive far better, while also adequately accommo-
dating government enforcement concerns.
-Niki Kuckes
102. In this context, attorney's fee awards should be regarded not as a punitive measure but as a
necessary cost of ensuring the fair administration of the law. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 12
(statement of Sen. Nelson) ("Congress should make it clear in these cases that the possible costs of
attorney's fees is a part of the cost of doing government business.").
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